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ABSTRACT: This paper provides an analysis of two cycles of monetary 
easing in Mexico. The first took place in 2009, during the global 
financial crisis, and the second occurred in 2013−2014, when the 
Mexican economy lost dynamism. In both periods, the actions taken 
by the Bank of Mexico provide ample evidence of its efforts to stabilize 
output and employment, while ceding importance to the fight against 
inflation and, in doing so, adopting a hierarchical mandate. The 
abundant global liquidity generated in developed countries by the 
great recession facilitated the monetary flexibilization in Mexico. A 
revision of official information from the Bank of Mexico in 2009 and 
2013−2014 provides data on the cuts made to the reference rate, 
their periodicity, as well as their quantity. The two cycles of monetary 
expansion diminished the cost of money with the goal of incentivizing 
investment and consumption while counteracting the weakness of the 
Mexican economy.
Keywords: Bank of Mexico; monetary policy; Inflation Targeting; 
interest rate; inflation.
RESUMEN: El trabajo analiza dos ciclos de relajamiento monetario 
en México, el primero en 2009 con la crisis mundial y el segundo en 
2013−2014 cuando la economía mexicana perdió dinamismo; para 
evidenciar las acciones de Banco de México por estabilizar en dos 
momentos el producto y el empleo, restándole importancia al combate 
a la inflación y en los hechos adoptando un mandato jerarquizado. La 
abundante liquidez mundial que se generó en los países desarrollados 
por la gran recesión facilitó la flexibilización monetaria en México. 
Mediante una revisión de información oficial de Banco de México en 
2009 y 2013−2014, se presentan los recortes a la tasa de referencia, 
su periodicidad y su cuantía. Los dos ciclos de expansión monetaria 
disminuyeron el costo del dinero con el propósito de incentivar la 
inversión y el consumo y contrarrestar la debilidad de la economía 
mexicana.  
Palabras clave: Banco de México; política monetaria; objetivos de 
inflación; tasa de interés; inflación. 
JEL: E51, E52, E58
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of 1917 proposed the creation 
of a central bank under the charge of the Mexican 
state, which should act to reconstruct the mone-
tary, creditary, and financial arms of the nation, 
re−establish public confidence in fiduciary funds 
lost due to the revolution, and provide the federal 
government with access to financing. Seven years 
later, the Banco de Mexico (BM) was finally created, 
emerging as the central bank of the Mexican state, 
an accomplishment achieved under the guise of the 
figure of a single emissory bank (Banco Único de 
Emision) (Ruíz, 2016). From the end of the Second 
World War to the beginning of the 1980s, the bank’s 
primary objective was to channel resources into pro-
duction and to provide financing, via primary credit, 
to the government in an effort to grow output and 
employment. 
The pinnacle of these endeavors occurred in the 
1970s under the so−called populist governments. 
However, in the 1990s came the arrival of the second 
liberal−leaning period of government in Mexico, 
during which time the central bank was transfor-
med, its mandate being to centralize its efforts on 
safeguarding the acquisitive power of money, in 
other words, to combat inflation (Banco de Mexico, 
1995; Carstens & Reynoso, 1997). Subsequently, in 
the 21st century, BM has taken on a new strategic 
direction. Strengthened by its credibility and with 
a scaffold to separate it from the public, the insti-
tution has assumed a new role with a new goal: to 
stabilize output through counter−cyclical monetary 
policy.
This paper provides an analysis of two cycles of mo-
netary easing in Mexico: the first in 2009 in the face 
of the global crisis, and the second in 2013−2014 
when the Mexican economy lost momentum. This 
analysis shows how the Bank of Mexico made efforts 
to stabilize output and employment during both the-
se periods, ceding importance to the fight against 
inflation and in so doing adopting a hierarchical 
mandate. A revision of the official information of BM 
from 2009 and 2013−2014 provides data showing 
the cuts made to the reference rate, as well as 
both the periodicity and the quantity of said cuts. 
Furthermore, it will be shown how these two cycles 
of monetary expansion diminished the cost of mo-
ney to incentivize investment and consumption and 
counteract the weakness of the Mexican economy.
This investigation is comprised of four parts: this 
first part provides an introduction with reference 
to the structural change undergone by BM and the 
effects on monetary policy via distinct channels of 
transmission. The second provides the methodology 
used, the third is about the results the analysis of 
the first cycle of monetary easing which occurred 
in 2009, and the second cycle of monetary easing 
which took place in 2013−2014. The paper then 
closes with conclusions and suggestions for further 
research.
In the 1980s Mexico undertook structural changes 
across all of its economic institutions, which entai-
led a gradual albeit irreversible transformation of 
every sector of the economy, with the goal of con-
solidating a flexible, unregulated market economy 
with no interference from the state in the fixing of 
public and (even less so of) private prices (Solis, 
1997). Gradually the state ceased being a producer 
of goods and services, and public businesses began 
to be sold to private initiatives. The substitutive 
import model ceased to be dominant and a se-
condary export−based model was constructed in 
the commercial opening and through international 
competition (Aspe,1993). The most significant 
changes were evidenced in Mexico’s entrance into 
the General Agreement on Tax and Trade (GATT) in 
1986, which later would become the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the putting into motion of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 
1994 (Cabrera & Rojas, 2006).
The structural change witnessed in Mexico encom-
passed both the fiscal and exchange sectors, as well 
as the monetary ambits. With respect to the latter, 
the reform was felt with even greater magnitude 
when, in 1993, article 28 of the Constitution was 
reformed, mandating to the Bank of Mexico the 
safeguarding of the acquisitive power of the peso 
and conceding to the BM full autonomy in the 
management of its internal net credit (Carstens & 
Werner, 1999). In doing so, the reform impeded BM 
from granting financing to any authority. Moreover, 
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this institutional redesign included the following 
elements: i) it eliminated the discretion by which 
the federal government could remove officials of 
the BM and ii) from 2011 onwards, the calculation 
of inflation became a task of the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). It must be noted 
that the institute was granted administrative and 
managerial autonomy, but not independence in its 
objectives, terms which remain enshrined in article 
28 of the Constitution (CPEUM, 23-08-1993; Banco 
de Mexico, 1994; Banco de México, 1995; Turrent, 
2010). 
In the first years of the 21st century, Mexico 
experienced a drop in inflation which reached 
single-digit levels. In 2001, the BM adopted the 
Inflation Targeting Approach (ITA), a policy scheme 
widely recognized for its achievements in diverse 
developing countries (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, 
& Posen, 2001; Friedman, 1968; Friedman, 1991; 
Taylor, 1993; Taylor, 2000). The adoption of ITA was 
possible due to three pre-existing elements: i) the 
autonomy of the Central Bank, ii) the fight against 
inflation as its primary objective, iii) the increase 
of communication between the BM and the public. 
Short and medium-term inflation targets were made 
official: 10% in 2000, 6.5% in 2001, 4.5% in 2002 
and 3% in 2003, with the latter to remain as a 
long-term goal with a variability interval of +/− one 
percentage point. The national index of consumer 
prices was adopted with an emphasis on underlying 
inflation as the official indicator for compliance with 
inflation goals (Banco de Mexico, 2001).
As the years passed, prices maintained a lower, less 
volatile trajectory. From 1995 to 2000, observed 
inflation was greater than the target set by the 
authority. Nevertheless, the gap between observed 
inflation and the target set by the institute was 
contracting (Banco de Mexico, 2003a). From 2001 
onwards, when the announcements on short and 
midterm goals were made by officials via ITA, the 
level of observed prices tended to settle around 
their target. This situation was consolidated after 
2003 when inflation rounded to 3% and came to rest 
within the +/-1 percentage point interval—with the 
exception of 2009 when the international crisis im-
pacted the Mexican economy (Sánchez, 2011). This 
panorama of lowered and less varied price formation 
provided a context during which the autonomy of the 
central bank, the flexible exchange type regime and 
the inflation target characterized Mexican monetary 
policy, as you see in Figure 1 (Banco de Mexico, 
2009c; Banco de Mexico, 2010).
Figure 1.
Inflation objectives and observed inflation from 1995 to 2016.
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The adoption ITA by the BM increased the activi-
ties of transparency and taking hold of accounts 
from the authority to private agents. Similarly, the 
elaboration of a “Quarterly Report” in 2001 and a 
calendar to communicate monetary policy decisions 
were added to regular publications. Undoubtedly the 
most significant measure taken, however, was when 
the authority began to fix the level of the interbank 
interest rate (IIR) in 2008, which would move on the 
order of 25 base points (BP) substituting the zero 
average reserve requirement and in so doing conver-
ting it into the primary instrument through which BM 
enacts and communicates its monetary policy posture. 
Transmission mechanisms for the monetary 
policy 
The mechanism of transmission of the BM’s monetary 
policy is represented in Figure 2, which demonstra-
tes that inflation surges due to demand pressures 
(aggregate demand) and/or supply pressures (ag-
gregate supply). The BM fixes its monetary posture 
by increasing or decreasing, depending on the case, 
the level of the IIR on the order of 25 BP (or this 
can be left unchanged). This activity is then trans-
mitted to the economy through distinct channels: 
i) channel of interest rates, ii) channel of credit, 
iii) channel of prices of other assets, iv) channel of 
exchange rate and v) channel of expectations. The 
first three impact aggregate demand and the last 
two affect aggregate supply. It is worth highlighting 
that the exchange channel has repercussions on both 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
In the case of the channel of interest rates (also 
known as the channel of traditional transmission), 
a restrictive action (versus relaxed action) provokes 
a rising displacement of the curve of intertemporal 
performances of all the interest rates in the economy 
(Apotela, Ardavín & Cruz, 2001). Said increases 
affect savings, investment and consumption, affec-
ting aggregate demand and prices (Taylor, 1995). 
In the case of the channel of credit, a restrictive 
action (versus relaxed action) provokes a rise in the 
interest rate, influencing the supply and demand of 
credit, negatively impacting investment spending, 
aggregate demand and price formation (Bernanke & 
Blinder, 1992). In the case of the type of exchange, 
a restrictive action (versus relaxed action) provokes 
a rise in the interest rate, which appreciates local cu-
rrency with respect to foreign currency, influencing 
goods produced internally with respect to foreign 
goods, which in turn impacts the prices of imported 
goods and costs, on aggregate supply and prices 
(Copelman & Werner, 1995; Baqueiro, Díaz de León 
& Torres 2003; Calvo & Reinhart, 2002).
Figure 2.
Transmission mechanism for the monetary policy.
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Source: Elaborated with information from Banco de Mexico (2003b).
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With respect to the price channel for other financial 
actors, a restrictive action (versus relaxed action) 
increases the interest rate affecting the value of 
the market for businesses and consumer wealth 
(Mishkin, 1996). On the one hand, an increase 
in the interest rate makes bonds more attractive 
and makes buying stocks less attractive, which 
lowers the price of the market for businesses. 
Consequently, firms face difficulties in new inves-
tments, interrupting their growth and influencing 
aggregate demand and prices. On the other hand, 
an increase in the interest rate and the reduction 
of the price of stocks diminishes the value of in-
vestment portfolios for families and with this, their 
wealth decreases, provoking lower consumption, 
less aggregate demand and drop in price formation 
(Mishkin, 1995; Mishkin, 2011). In sum, the inter-
est rate rises and the rhythm of economic activity 
tends to diminish, as do prices.
To illustrate the effects of monetary policy on 
the economy, we can consider two examples. The 
first refers to a scenario, in which the restrictive 
monetary policy fights against inflation and BM 
rises by 25 BP or multiples of it the level of IIR. 
This action a) increases the cost of money, causing 
diminishing investment and consumption—the 
result being a decrease in aggregate demand and 
prices; b) diminishes the availability of credit, the 
investment spending of businesses and reduces the 
aggregate demand and prices; c) increases the at-
tractiveness of bonds to the detriment of the stocks 
of businesses, which decrease their investments, 
leading to a reduction in aggregate demand and 
prices; d) provokes an appreciation of the Mexican 
peso with respect to the American dollar, fortifying 
imports, reducing cuts, aggregate demand and price 
formation; e) rapid influence on the forecasts of 
economic agents, who trust that the BM will act to 
prevent deviations of inflation from its target. The 
agents will make daily economic decisions based on 
the inflation target announced by BM, which is to 
say they will not take on contracts with an inflation 
greater than the goal stated by the authority. The 
public trusts that the BM will comply with the goal 
they themselves set, which in the case of Mexico 
is 3% in the long-term. In sum, the interest rate 
rises and the rhythm of economic activity tends 
to diminish, as do prices.
The second example envisions a scenario in which 
a relaxed monetary policy stabilizes the economy 
and employment. In this case, the BM perceives 
an expected weakness in economic growth and 
employment, and thus lowers by 25 BP or multiples 
therefore the level of the IIR. Such action a) dimi-
nishes the cost of money, generating an increase in 
investment and consumption, the result being an 
increase in aggregate demand and production; b) 
increases the availability of credit, the investment 
spending of businesses and increasing aggregate 
demand and production; c) diminishes the attracti-
veness of bonds in favour of business actions, with 
businesses investing more and increasing aggregate 
demand and production; d) provokes a depreciation 
of the peso with respect to the dollar, fortifying ex-
ports, increasing aggregate demand and production; 
e) decreases the IIR index rapidly in the hopes that 
economic agents, recognizing a drop in the cost of 
money, would incentivize investment, consumption, 
production of goods and services, and income ge-
neration among the population. Soon the economy 
begins to breathe again in the face of the weakness 
it has experienced. In sum, the low interest rate and 
rhythm of economy activity tend to rise.
The BM works with a unique mandate, meaning that 
the weighing of its monetary policy decisions are 
done completely through the control of inflation. 
This suggests that the BM does not react in the 
face of deviations of the GDP, or rather, that the 
recommended real interest rate could be affected 
only by deviations of inflation. The latter implies 
that giving weight to both objectives generates 
intermediate results. 
Review of literature on the subject
The qualitative analysis of the monetary easing 
of cycles in Mexico is recent, so there is limited 
literature on the subject. However, if an attempt is 
made to analyze the BM’s response to the weakening 
of output and employment, quantitative research 
work is available. Galindo & Guerrero (2003), who 
estimate a Taylor’s rule for Mexico from 1990-2000, 
argue that the BM focuses its efforts on controlling 
inflation. There is also Villagómez & Orellana (2009), 
who estimate a small-scale macro model of small 
scale from 1998 to 2008 and find that the BM has 
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a preference for stabilizing the output and not just 
inflation.
In his turn, Pérez (2012) also estimates, a Taylor 
rule for Mexico from 2002 to 2012 and points out 
that within the objectives of the issuing institute is 
to stabilize the output. In the case of Rodríguez & 
Alvarado (2016) they also estimate a Taylor rule from 
2000 to 2012 and find that the interest rate policy 
follows the output, although with some statistical 
weakness in the model. Although these works are 
different in terms of the periodicity of their studies, 
they allow to see changes in BM’s preferences re-
garding following the output.
METHODOLOGY
We analyse official information of the Banco de 
México from 2009 and 2013−2014 to have data 
that shows the cuts made to the reference rate, as 
well as both the periodicity and the quantity of said 
cuts. In 2009 and 2013-2014 there were two perio-
ds of slowdown in economic activity. We carefully 
review the following BM documents: Informe Anual 
de 2009, Recopilación de Informes Trimestrales 
Correspondientes al Año 2013, Recopilación de 
Informes Trimestrales Correspondientes al Año 2014, 
Programa de Política Monetaria para 2009, Programa 
de Política Monetaria para 2013, Programa de 
Política Monetaria para 2014, Informe sobre Política 
Monetaria para el Primer Semestre de 2009, Informe 
sobre Política Monetaria para el Segundo Semestre de 
2009, Informe sobre Política Monetaria para el Primer 
Semestre de 2013, Informe sobre Política Monetaria 
para el Segundo Semestre de 2013, Informe sobre 
Política Monetaria para el Primer Semestre de 2014, 
Informe sobre Política Monetaria para el Segundo 
Semestre de 2014, Informe de Inflación Enero-
Marzo de 2009, Informe de Inflación Abril-Junio 
de 2009, Informe de Inflación Julio-Septiembre 
de 2009, Informe de Inflación Octubre-Diciembre 
2009, Informe de Inflación Enero-Marzo 2013, 
Informe de Inflación Abril-Junio 2013, Informe de 
Inflación Julio-Septiembre 2013, Informe de infla-
ción Octubre-Diciembre 2013, Informe de Inflación 
Enero-Marzo 2014, Inflación de Informe Abril-Junio 
de 2014, Informe de Inflación Julio-Septiembre de 
2014 and Informe de Inflación Octubre-Diciembre 
de 2014.
Likewise, the Announcements of the Monetary Policy 
Decisions of BM were analyzed for the following 
dates: January 16, 2009; February 20, 2009; March 
20, 2009; April 17, 2009; May 15, 2009; June 19, 
2009; July 17, 2009; August 21, 2009; September 
18, 2009; October 16, 2009; November 27, 2009; 
January 18, 2013; March 8, 2013; April 26, 2013; 
June 7, 2013; July 12, 2013; September 6, 2013; 
October 25, 2013; December 6, 2013; January 31, 
2014; March 21, 2014;  April 25, 2014; June 6, 2014; 
July 11, 2014; September 5, 2014; October 31, 2014 
and December 5, 2014. Finally, the Minutes of the 
Meetings of the Board of Government of the BM on 
the following dates: January 18, 2013; March 8, 
2013; April 26, 2013; June 7, 2013; July 12, 2013; 
September 6, 2013; October 25, 2013; December 
6, 2013; January 31, 2014; March 21, 2014; April 
25, 2014; June 6, 2014; July 11, 2014; September 
5, 2014; October 31, 2014 and December 5, 20141. 
Our analysis of the IIR represents the BM’s primary 
monetary policy instrument for fighting inflation and 
influencing the economic cycle. Movements of the 
rate impact the economy through distinct channels 
of transmission, with these channels impacting 
aggregate supply and demand (Mishkin, 1995), as 
you can see lines below.
RESULTS
The first cycle of monetary easing in 2009
In January of 2009, the Bank of Mexico initiated a 
cycle of monetary easing of its’ monetary posture 
which continued through the months of February, 
March, April, May, and June, concluding in July. 
During this interval the level of the reference rate 
passed from 8.25% in January to 4.5%, the motiva-
tion for which was the deterioration of the balance 
of risks in the economy. This rate reduction occurred 
in the following stages: a drop in January of 50 BP, 
in February of 25 BP, in March of 75 BP, in April 
of 75 BP, in May of 75 BP, in June of 50 BP, and, 
finally, in July of 25 BP. The economic context in 
which this decrease in the cost of money developed 
was the following:
1  It is important to say that in the tex t we quote only those references that 
were used for this research.
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According to Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (BGFRS) the devastating collapse 
of Lehman Brothers (the fourth biggest investment 
bank in U.S.) in August of 2007 signified the spread 
of the financial crisis into economic activities and 
marked without doubt the most severe point of the 
crisis’ contingency (BGFRS, 2008; BGFRS, 2009; 
Rojas, 2017). The global growth diminished 0.6%, 
experiencing the first global contraction since the 
post-war period. The U.S. witnessed a 2.4% fall 
in its output, the biggest decrease in more than 
six decades (Rojas, 2015b). Similarly, the Mexican 
economy was seriously affected by the contagion 
of the crisis, with a decline of 6.5% in its econo-
mic activity—something not seen since the crisis 
of 1994-95. The outbreak of the AH1N1 influenza 
virus in Mexico added to the devastating effects 
of the global crisis in the first semester of 2009. 
For several days economic activities were almost 
completely paralyzed, affecting a broad panoply of 
financial sectors including commerce, local export 
industries, tourism and commercial aviation.
The economic crisis that was already having a global 
impact inevitably affected Mexico, and the point 
of contagion was the external sector, which is to 
say the exports from Mexico to its primary trading 
partner. Similarly, internal production diminished, 
putting the brakes on the influx of foreign exchange 
via tourism, direct investments and capital, and the 
remittances sent by foreign nationals. The automo-
tive sector was among those most severely affected 
by the crisis, due to its substantial dependence on 
the Mexican export industry, which was seriously 
impacted when two of the principle assembly plants 
in the U.S. reached the point of collapse. The inter-
dependence that exists between the external sector, 
export−related activities and industries, and the 
internal market spurred a rapid deceleration of the 
Mexican economy. The contagion ultimately resulted 
in an 8.9% fall in the Mexican output in annual 
terms, and a fall of 6.9% and 0.3% in the first and 
second quarters of the year, respectively (Banco de 
Mexico, 2010).
In 2008, the majority of the central banks of the 
world’s principal economies had significantly relaxed 
their monetary policy, with the goal of lowering the 
cost of money and assuaging the crisis. The weak-
ness of the global economy was such that central 
banks caught a dire glimpse of the future: extremely 
low interest rate levels for a prolonged period to 
come. In addition to conventional monetary policy 
actions, non-conventional actions were taken to 
increase the balance sheets of the Fed, which had 
served for more than a century as the United States’ 
central bank (Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2015a; Rojas 
2017). Once the global financial turbulence subsi-
ded, global capital flows changed, migrating from 
secure to risky positions, following the incentive 
offered by the differential rates of emerging markets 
with respect to developed markets. This provoked 
an inflow of resources to the former, slowing the 
brusque depreciations which had been occurring in 
developing countries.
This situation allowed a diverse range of central 
institutions from developing nations, including 
Mexico, to utilize their monetary policy to con-
front the economic weakness surging through 
their economies, a move made possible by the 
institutional credibility already generated. In 
addition to the aforementioned monetary supports, 
contra-cyclic fiscal policies were added although 
in lesser quantities. In a context of a decelerating 
global economy with decreasing supply shocks for 
the economies of developing countries, inflation 
was not the foremost problem in the majority of 
those nations. Mexico, in turn, was no exception, 
witnessing considerable decreases in inflation: of 
6.5% and 3.5% in 2008 and 2009, respectively 
(Guzmán, 2016).
In the economic context outlined above, the Bank of 
Mexico began, in January of 2009, a cycle of easing 
of its monetary posture which continued through 
the months of February, March, April, May, June and 
terminated in July. During this period the reference 
rate level fell from 8.25% in January to 4.5%, the 
motivation for which was purportedly that “the 
balance of risks in the economy had deteriorated” 
(Banco de Mexico, 2010). This decline in the interest 
rate proceeded in the following manner: 50 BP in 
January, 25 BP in February, 75 BP in March, 75 BP 
in April, 75 BP in May, 50 BP in June, and finally 
25 BP in July (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. 
∆% Gross national product and % interbank interest rate from 2008.I to 2011.IV
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According to the minutes from the Governor’s mee-
ting of the Bank of Mexico, bank officials argued for 
something new in Mexico’s monetary practice, stating 
that the balance of risks facing monetary policy was 
being affected by the evolution of economic activity 
and that now it was not inflation but rather the out-
put and perhaps also unemployment, which were the 
primary concerns. On this point, it must be mentioned 
that the possibility for the Mexican issuing institute 
to initiate countercyclical policy is due to the cre-
dibility built up since the constitutional reform of 
1994 and the strengthening of that credibility when 
focused inflation targets were adopted.  The start of 
the cycle of monetary easing began with the monetary 
policy announcement of January 16, 2009, when the 
rate dropped 50 BP2, passing from 8.25% to 7.75% 
(Banco de México, 2009a).
Subsequently, on April 20, 2009, the BM lowered the 
rate by 75 BP. The rate dropped from 6.75% to 6%, 
2  The components of the balance of risks have deteriorated, especially in 
what is referred to as economic activity with regard to inflation.
and the following was commented: “The important 
drop that has been registered in the economic activi-
ty has required preventative monetary policy actions 
that contribute to mitigate unfavorable impacts of 
the crisis” (Banco de México, 2009b, p.1).
Subsequently, the announcement of June 19, 2009, 
lead to a drop of 50 BP and the rate passed from 
5.25%3 to 4.75% (Banco de México, 2009d). Finally, 
the cycle of monetary easing concluded with the 
announcement by BM on July 17, 2009, which 
informed of a reduction of the rate, which dropped 
from 4.75% to 4.5%, with a concomitant reduction 
of 25 BP4 (Banco de Mexico, 2009e).
As shown, the Bank of Mexico made base point 
reductions of the monetary instrument IIR with 
the objective of exerting a positive influence over 
3  The monetary policy actions taken until now have been of a preventative 
character. 
4  With respect to this the authorities noted that the Board of Governors has 
decided to reduce by 25 BP the interbank interest rate for the day, to a level 
of 4.50 percent and put a pause on the cycle of monetary easing. 
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aggregate demand. That is to say it was motivated 
to stimulate the output through incentives which 
were translated into cheaper credits to increase 
productive investment and, with this, reduce the 
unemployment rate. 
The second cycle of monetary easing, 
2013−2014
The central bank initiated a second cycle of mone-
tary easing in March of 2013 with a 50 BP cut to 
the reference rate, which dropped from 4.5% to 4%. 
The quantitative easing continued with reductions 
of 25 BP for the months of September and October 
respectively. The rate passed from 4% to 3.5%, 
which meant that the issuing authority had aggre-
gated a drop of 150 BP in 2013 and 2014, with the 
argument that the increase of the gap in the output 
was evidence of a greater weakness in the Mexican 
economy (Carstens, 2015).  
The Mexican economy began to decelerate towards 
the second semester of 2012, after having grown 
to annual rates of 5% in 2009, 5.2% in 2010, 4.9% 
in 2011 and finally 3.9% in 2012. In the second 
semestre of 2012, the economy lost dynamism, due 
to the great expenditure associated with the presi-
dential elections, and this deceleration continued 
with greater force in the first semester of 2013. This 
loss of economic drive was undoubtedly due to the 
economic problems in the U.S. (Mexico’s primary 
business partner) and the loss of force of Mexico’s 
internal market.
In 2013, after five years of non-conventional mone-
tary actions on behalf of the Fed, that institution 
was preparing to normalize its monetary policy 
(Rojas, 2015b). This generated a reaccomodation of 
investment portfolios across practically the entire 
world, generating in turn a reshuffling of investment 
funds. International capital began to flow from 
developed to developing nations, generating vola-
tility and instability in the international financial 
markets. The volatility was strongest in exchange 
markets, falling mostly on developing countries, 
including Mexico. The result was an appreciation of 
the peso with respect to the dollar in the first se-
mester of 2013, and subsequently a depreciation of 
the Mexican currency in the second semestre of that 
year. The appreciation of the peso against the dollar 
in the first semester of 2013 weakened the dynamism 
of Mexican exports in the U.S. In the second half of 
2013, the powerful outflow of capital devalued the 
peso against the dollar, newly incentivizing sales 
from Mexico to its northern neighbour (Banco de 
Mexico, 2014b).
With the change of government in Mexico in 2014, 
the public expenditure ceased to flow adequately, 
slowing down due to the processes of transition and 
learning of the new high level officials. Consumer 
confidence had ceased growing since the second 
semester of 2012 and began to fall with force in the 
first semester of 2013. What contributed further to 
the loss of momentum in the internal market was un-
doubtedly the weakness of the housing sector, which 
crashed when the incoming federal government 
drastically modified the rules of the game in the 
country’s housing industry. Lowered consumption, 
investment and government spending all accentua-
ted the deceleration of the economy towards the 
first half of 2013 (Esquivel, 2013).
This weakening resulted in a broadening of the gap 
in output, understood as the difference between 
the observed output and the potential output. 
With this indicator in mind and, with the reference 
rate having remained unchanged, the BM decided 
to initiate a second cycle of monetary easing in 
march of 2013 to shore up the economy, lowering 
the IIR by 50 BP to the level of 4% (Banco de 
Mexico, 2013b).
The foregoing aside, in the months that followed, the 
public spending continued to flow slowly, without 
reaching previous crisis levels, while weakened pri-
vate consumption continued and the construction 
sector remained in freefall. Housing companies were 
facing a difficult financial situation, to the extent 
that they began entering into processes of trade 
competition for their liquidation. To reinforce the 
weak—although still positive—economic growth, 
the central bank decided to implement new cuts 
to the reference rate target, of 25 BP in September 
and October, respectively. The rate objective drop-
ped from 4% to 3.5%, signifying that the issuing 
institute authored a loss of 100 BP in 2013 as you 
can see Figure 4 (Banco de Mexico, 2013c).
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Figure 4. 
∆% Gross national product and % interbank interest rate from 2011.I to 2014.IV
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Source: Elaborated with information of INEGI and BM.
To that end, monetary support on behalf of the 
central bank would be added an attempted fiscal 
policy of a relatively abnormal nature: a housing 
reform which proposed to increase taxes and public 
spending. With this, government expenses increased 
by nearly 10% in 2014, as compared to the previous 
year. Right from the start, the business sector looked 
askance at the proposal to increase taxes, public 
debt, and the amount of public spending; conside-
ring it a set of poorly proposed fiscal supports, if 
indeed this was what the government truly wanted. 
The housing reform began to negatively influence 
the mood of the public from the moment it was ap-
proved by the permanent constituency. The reform 
included the abolition of the single rate business 
tax (Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Unica or IETU) and 
the tax on cash deposits (Impuesto a los Depósitos 
en Efectivo or IDE), the unification of the tax on 
aggregated value (Impuesto al Valor Agregado or 
IVA) across the border region, the new levies on 
sugar-sweetened beverages and high−caloric foods, 
a new tax on gasoline, the elimination of special 
regimes, higher levies on high wage−earners and a 
tax on dividends and capital gains.
In 2014, the BM began the year with an ambitious 
fiscal plan to support growth as well as the continua-
tion of the laxer monetary policy put in place during 
the previous year. It was seen by old Keynesians as 
the best of all possible worlds, fiscal politics and 
monetary expansiveness. Nevertheless, the Mexican 
economy did not seem to respond well. One of the 
primary reasons was because in the first trimester 
of the year, the U.S. economy lost momentum due 
to adverse climatic conditions, principally along 
the country’s eastern coast. Mexican exports to the 
U.S. decelerated, negatively impacting growth and 
the creation of employment, though this negati-
vity would dissipate to a certain degree over the 
following months. 2014 was characterized by an 
increase in public spending, most notably in inves-
tments in public works and social programs. Despite 
the increase in public expenditure contained in the 
new fiscal package, economic activity remained 
weak through the first trimester of 2014 (Banco de 
Mexico, 2014b).
For its part, the BM decided in June of that year to 
once again cut the IIR rate, from 3.5 to 3.0, consi-
dering the continuing growth of the gap in output, 
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which was perhaps worsened by the operationaliza-
tion of the structural reforms approved by Congress. 
It is without doubt that the BM was concerned about 
the deceleration of economic activity and decided 
to extend the cycle of monetary easing which had 
begun in March of 2013. 
As demonstrated, the BM undertook a second cycle of 
monetary easing by means of successive cuts to the 
target of the IIR rate, with the objective of influen-
cing productive activities (Banco de Mexico, 2014d). 
The BM incorporated new monetary incentives, 
which translated into more spending on productive 
investment, greater aggregate demand, and a rise 
in the economy. It was among the arguments put 
forth by the BM to justify lowering the target from 
4.5% to 4%, which is to say by 50 BP5, in March of 
2013 (Banco de Mexico, 2013a). 
For its part, in the Minutes of Monetary Policy 
(Minuta de Política Monetaria) number 22, it ar-
gued that: “the majority of members of the Board 
asserted that the balance of risks for growing the 
Mexican economy has deteriorated” (Banco de 
Mexico, 2013d, p.22) and the institute considered 
that “the production gap is in negative terrain and 
that it is expected to remain below zero at least 
until 2014” (Banco de Mexico, 2013d, p.14). After 
the BM lowered the target of the rate from 4% to 
3.5% in September and October of 2013, by 25 BP,6 
respectively (Banco de Mexico, 2013b; Banco de 
Mexico, 2013e).
In June of 2014, the BM cut for a final time the 
reference rate, which dropped from 3% to 4%7 
(Banco de Mexico, 2014a; Banco de Mexico, 2014c). 
Ample qualitative evidence exists to show that the 
BM undertook and oversaw two cycles of monetary 
easing, in 2009 and 2013−2014, and in both cases 
diminished the cost of money in the country in an 
5  This reduction in the reference interest rate for the monetary policy facili-
tated the adjustment of the economy to an environment of lower economic 
growth and less inflation. 
6  In the second quarter of the year the weakening of economic activity was 
generalized and faster than anticipated, which gave rise to a contraction 
of the output in the quarters and a significant increase in the width in the 
economy. 
7  The members of the Board of Governors asserted that the ordered control 
over public finances permits in turn a greater flexibility in the management 
of monetary policy. 
effort to drive economic activity and employment. 
The minutes from the meeting of the board of go-
vernors of that institution clearly demonstrate the 
posture of its officials with respect to the gap in 
output and providing support for the former claim. 
CONCLUSIONS
At the end of the 20th century, Mexico undertook 
a change in its economic model, a change which 
would continue and be further reinforced in the 
21st century, generating a structural change in 
the economy and all of its institutions. The central 
bank put into motion a structural shift which would 
not be undone. It was granted administrative and 
managerial autonomy and—for the first time in 
its’ history—its primary, driving objective became 
battling inflation, while it cancelled the possibility 
of financing the government through the creation 
of money. With inflation at single digit levels in 
this century, BM adopted ITA as the marker for 
good monetary policy practice among the world’s 
central banks. A long-term inflation target of 3% 
was made official and the actions of the monetary 
authority were made more transparent. Inflation has 
been low, hovering around 3% in the last 10 years. 
The primordial objective has been to safeguard the 
acquisitive power of the Mexican peso.
Nevertheless, in 2009 and 2013−2014, the BM un-
dertook efforts to stabilize the output in the face 
of the financial crisis in the U.S., and to reverse 
the deceleration of the Mexican economy, which 
coincided with the new Mexican government. Its 
activities shifted from guiding inflation to the new 
target of stabilizing output around its potential 
output level. It appeared that the central bank’s 
actions were being controlled via the use of a Taylor-
type policy rule, which describes the movement of 
interest rates in response to deviations of inflation 
from its desired level or target (the inflation gap) 
and the diversion of the output from its natural rate 
level (the output gap).
The members of the board of governors of the BM 
directed two cycles of target lowering for the IIR 
because the economy was growing below the level 
of its output potential. The BM was concerned 
not only about inflation, as in the 1980s, but 
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moreover about the low growth of the economy. 
The question this raises academically is whether 
in the future: will it be necessary to reform article 
28 of the Constitution to include the promotion of 
the output and employment as an objective of the 
BM, such as in fact exists in the U.S. legislation? 
Further investigation is required to determine via 
quantitative measures whether cuts to the IIR had 
a positive impact on the behavior of the output and 
of employment. This is without a doubt an important 
area for further research.
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